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ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
A comparison of the Stien opening brief with the 
responsive brief of the Defendants shows a considerable difference 
in the conceptual framework of the arguments made. Stien takes a 
straight-forward approach of explaining that Utah law on Invasion 
of Privacy is not well developed. Stien explains in her opening 
brief that the Restatement (Second) of Torts is often recognized by 
Utah courts as a source of authority to develop law. Stien then 
reviews the element of each of the four branches of the tort of 
Invasion of Privacy and explains why there are issues and facts for 
trial. 
By contrast, the conceptual framework of the Brief of 
Appellees is to make the common error on appeal of creating a legal 
straw man and avoiding direct analysis of the issues presented by 
the appeal. This Reply Brief will explain how Stien's arguments 
raised are not met. 
B. Appellees Elevate Form Over Substance. 
A common thread running through the multiple arguments of 
Appellees is that because Ms. Stien was not identified by name nor 
was her likeness shown she could not have an invasion of her 
privacy interest. The problem with that argument is that it is far 
too restrictive and exalts form over substance. The argument 
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ignores the context in which the video was made and displayed. 
The discussion of the sex life of Bauman and Stien occurred in 
the context of a well attended corporation Christmas party at which 
people were present who knew the identity of Ms. Stien. When the 
superscript was placed on the screen of "what is it like to have 
sex with your partner" and Mr. Bauman was shown, there could be 
little doubt about whom reference is being made unless the 
implication was that Brad Bauman was engaged in adultery. To argue 
that Bauman's so called "partner" was not shown or stated by name 
is an extraordinarily fine line to be drawn. The line drawing is 
inappropriate in light of Utah public policy to protect privacy. 
That Ms. Stien was recognizable as a subject of the sex discussion 
is reinforced by the reference of Mr. Bauman to his "wife" in the 
video. At worst, a question of fact for trial is presented. 
As pointed out in the principal brief, Redding v. Brady, 606 
P.2d 1193 (Utah 1980) recognized that Utah law protects against 
"shame or humiliation" arising from violation of privacy interests. 
Whether there is sufficient information presented in the video to 
identify Ms. Stien is a question of fact for trial. Human 
interaction has nuance beyond whether her name or picture 
appeared. Enough is alleged that a jury could reasonably find that 
the tape refers to her private matters and she would be recognized 
by a group of people that know Bauman and her. 
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C. First Amendment Analysis Is Not Helpful. 
A second major theme which threads through the response of the 
Appellees is that the First Amendment protects this tasteless 
entertainment. Appellees analyze by creating a straw man 
concerning First Amendment rights. A close reading of the 
Appellees' Brief shows that they rely entirely upon First Amendment 
press cases. In each of those cases, the underlying complaint 
involved formal publication of alleged defamatory material in a 
printed publication or magazine. For example, Fudge v. Penthouse 
International, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012 (1st Cir. 1988), involved the 
publication of a picture of four school girls in Penthouse Magazine 
without their permission. The court discusses at length the First 
Amendment implications of magazines and newspapers and speaks of 
the "social context" of a picture in a magazine and the purpose for 
which the picture was published. The Court found significant First 
Amendment press interests that outweighed the likelihood of harm. 
In Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th 
Cir. 1982), the court considered an article in a magazine that 
created a fantasy discussion of the sexual activity of Miss 
Wyoming. The case does not discuss the invasion of privacy issues 
as the Court found that the First Amendment protects the 
publication under analysis of freedom of press issues. 
Another example of a strained analogy is the Appellees' use of 
Salek v. Passiac Collegiate School, 605 A.2d 276 (N.J.Super. 1992), 
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which considered the juxtaposition of pictures of two teachers in 
a school yearbook in which a female teacher is implied to be 
turning down the sexual proposition of a male teacher. The trial 
judge correctly held as a matter of law that the implication of 
turning down a sexual proposition could not be defamatory or invade 
privacy. This case does not involve an active commentary of an 
individual's sexual activity, as here. 
Stien presents no First Amendment protected publication issue. 
The analogy fails because the balancing interests of the press 
contained in the cases cited by Appellees is not present here. 
Should Appellees want to argue by analogy, they should have 
compared cases of private parties defending defamation claims. 
Stien's opening brief points out that publication isn ot even as 
element for three of the tort theories. 
Appellees try to wring more out of their First Amendment 
analogy by hinting that Ms. Stien is a public figure whose 
reputation and privacy may be more liberally assailed. See 
Appellees' Brief, Page 14, Footnote 5. Stien does not claim that 
she was defamed and the public figure comparison is inappropriate. 
A public figure is a term of art applicable to persons who are 
thrust into public view by controversy and for which the public 
interest is served by a higher standard of malice in asserting 
defamation claims. See Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 
P.2d 896 (Utah 1992). 
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The real danger of spending time discussing First Amendment 
cases is that it begs the question of the interests the law 
protects. What is at issue in this litigation are privacy 
interests and not reputation interests as with the defamation 
cases. Certainly, there can be some overlap in analysis, as 
demonstrated by the press cases relied upon by the Appellees, but 
the overlap is not complete. Otherwise, there would be no purpose 
in recognizing separate causes of action. See Russell, Id., which 
affirmatively states the torts of privacy invasion and defamation 
are not the same. 
That the First Amendment analogy is inappropriate in this case 
is demonstrated by a simple fact scenario. No one could seriously 
argue that an employer would be free to physically injure Bauman 
and Stien pursuant to a practical joke. The law would protect 
their interest in physical security. Here, the law is protecting 
their interest in privacy and it is the injury to privacy by a 
claimed practical joke for which remedy is sought. Defendants 
cheapen the First Amendment by invoking its protection raised in 
cases that involve formal publication of written material. This is 
not an overlapped case with a free speech issue as Stien complains 
the video invades her recognized privacy interest rather than 
defame her. 
As Appellee points out in her opening brief, there is an 
overlay of public policy to this case concerning the relationships 
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between employers and employees. Stien makes no pretense that she 
is an employee of the defendant, but there can be no serious 
dispute that this incident arises out of the employer/employee 
relationship of her husband. Appellees try to sidestep these 
public policy issues by simply stating Stien is not an employee and 
claiming they do not understand the citation of Bodewig v. K-Mart, 
Inc., 635 P.2d 657 (OR.App. 1981). £££ Appellee's Brief, Page 15, 
Footnote 6. What Bodewig demonstrates is that there are limits to 
the employer's right to control and demand obedience of employees. 
The use of an employee and a spouse's privacy for a practical joke 
is, by common social sense, outside the proper employer 
relationship as a matter of public policy. Construction of the law 
and facts should be made in light of the employer here having no 
legitimate legal or social reason to make entertainment out of 
society's most private matter. 
CONCLUSION 
This Reply Brief does not attempt to make a point by point 
response to the brief of the Appellees. Both sides struggle with 
the lack of case law in Utah to give guidance on the application of 
new tort law to the facts presented. How Stien addresses this void 
in Utah law is to simply take the plain language of the Restatement 
of Torts and apply it to the facts. The Appellees approach the 
absence of Utah law by analogizing to First Amendment press cases 
in other jurisdictions. 
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The Stien approach is the better approach because it preserves 
the privacy interest which Utah law protects without getting into 
discussions of defamation and reputation, both issues which have 
not been raised by Stien. Instead, Stien takes a common sense 
approach that says one need only look at the context of the video 
to see that the failure to mention her by name or to show her is 
inconsequential. The people present, who knew Brad Bauman and her, 
know to whom the tape was referring. Whether the nexus is 
sufficient to support fully a claim and the scope of the injury to 
Stien are all matters of fact for resolution at a trial. 
This Court should recognize the four alternative legal 
theories of invasion of privacy and should recognize that Ms. Stien 
has presented facts which raise genuine issues for a jury to 
consider and evaluate. The District Court should be reversed and 
the case remanded for trial. 
DATED this 6th day of March, 1997. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
GREGORY^X/ SANDERS, ESQ. 
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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